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EQUAL PROTECTION
United States Constitution Amendment XTV Section 1:
[NIor shall any State. .. deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
New York Constitution Article I, Section 11:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person
shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any
other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution,
or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Affronti v. Crosson'
(decided March 22, 2001)
Plaintiffs, current and former Monroe County Family
Court Judges, challenged the constitutionality of Judiciary Law
§§ 221-d2 and 221-e,3 claiming that the statutorily enacted pay
disparities between the Monroe County Family Court Judges and
Judges serving in the Family Courts of Sullivan, Putnam, and
Suffolk Counties violated their equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution4 and article I,
'95 N.Y.2d 713, 746 N.E.2d 1049, 723 N.Y.S.2d 757 (2001).
2 N.Y. COMPENSATION OF JUDGES LAW § 221-d (1995).
3 Id. § 221-e.
4 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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§ 11 of the New York State Constitution. 5 The Trial Court
declared that the salary disparities between plaintiffs and the
judges sitting in Family Court in Sullivan, Suffolk, and Putnam
Counties lacked a rational basis and violated plaintiffs' equal
protection rights. 6 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, reversed as to the Putnam and Suffolk County salary
differentials, but affirmed with respect to the pay disparities
between plaintiffs and the Sullivan County Family Court judges.7
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the court stated
that "because a rational basis exists for the salary disparities,
... the challenged provisions did not violate equal protection." 8
In April 1992, plaintiffs commenced this action seeking
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The action was
brought against the Chief Administrator of the Courts of New
York, Matthew T. Crosson, and the Comptroller of the State of
New York, Edward Regan, and the State of New York. 9
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated their equal protection
rights under the Federal and State Constitutions. Under Judiciary
Law § 221-e,10 the statutory salaries of Sullivan and Suffolk
County Family Court Judges were higher than the plaintiffs'
5 Affronti, 95 N.Y.2d at 716, 746 N.E.2d at 1050, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 758;
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 states:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall,
because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any
discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by
any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any
agency or subdivision of the state.
6 Affronti, 95 N.Y.2d at 717, 746 N.E.2d at 1051, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
7 Id. at 717-18, 746 N.E.2d at 1051, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
8 Id. at 717, 746 N.E.2d at 1050, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
9 Id.
'0 N.Y. COMPENSATION OF JUDGES LAW § 221-e (McKinney's 1983 & Supp.
2002 ) provides in pertinent part:
Effective on the dates indicated, the annual salaries of judges
of the civil court of the city of New York and the criminal
court of the city of New York shall be as follows: Judge of
.the Civil Court: $51,000, Judge of the Criminal Court:
$51,000.
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salaries and, under Judiciary Law § 221-d, 11 the salaries of
Putnam County Court Judges who serve in multi-bench capacity
were also higher. 
12
At trial, plaintiffs proffered evidence seeking to
demonstrate a similarity in the functions, duties and
responsibilities performed between themselves and judges in other
counties.13 Plaintiffs also sought to establish that the average cost
of single-family homes in Monroe County was greater than in
Sullivan County. 14 Defendants countered with expert testimony
and statistical data showing a cost of living differential between
Monroe and Suffolk Counties. 15  On appeal, the defendants
submitted U.S. Bureau of Census data from the New York State
Statistical Yearbook setting forth higher median home values in
Sullivan County than in Monroe County. However, the court
refused to consider the data on the ground that it was "presented
for first time in the brief of Defendants ... and, thus not properly
before the court." 
16
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division
with respect to the constitutionality of the salary disparities
between plaintiffs and their counterparts in Pultnam and Suffolk
Counties since the plaintiffs failed to meet their threshold burden
of demonstrating that the parties were similarly situated for equal
protection analysis. 17 However, in the case of Sullivan County
the court disagreed with the Fourth Department.
The court began its analysis of the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim by stating that "where a governmental
u N.Y. COMPENSATION OF JuDGEs LAW § 221-d (McKinney's 1983 & Supp.
2002 ) provides in pertinent part:
Effective on the dates indicated, the annual salaries of each
judge of the county court, the surrogate's court and the
family court shall be as follows: Monroe County: $51,000,
Putnam County: $55,000, Sullivan County: $52,000,
Suffolk County: $54,000.
'
2 Affronti, 95 N.Y.2d at 717, 746 N.E.2d at 1050, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
'61d. at 718, 746 N.E.2d at 1051, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 759,.
'7 Affronti, 95 N.Y.2d at 718, 746 N.E.2d at 1051, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
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classification is not based on an inherently suspect characteristic
and does not impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a
fundamental right, it need only rationally further a legitimate state
interest to be upheld as constitutional." 18 Undisputedly, the
disparate judicial salary schedules do not involve suspect classes
or fundamental rights and are therefore only subject to rational
basis review.' 9
In analyzing the issue of equal protection, the Court of
Appeals used the rational basis test created by the federal courts.
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,2° the United States
Supreme Court stated that when utilizing rational basis review,
"we will not overturn such government action unless the varying
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we
can only conclude that the government's actions were
irrational." 21 Essentially, the rational basis test under the equal
18 Id. at 718-19, 746 N.E.2d at 1052, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 760. See Nordlinger
v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). In Nordlinger, the petitioner, who recently
bought a home, filed suits against respondents, the county, and its tax assessor,
claiming that Article XIIIA's reassessment scheme violates the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. Article XIIIA embodies an "acquisition value" system
of taxation, whereby property is reassessed up to current appraised value upon
new construction or a change in ownership. Id. The court held that in
permitting longer-term owners to pay less in taxes than newer owners of
comparable property, this assessment scheme rationally furthers at least two
state interests. Id. First, because the state has a legitimate interest in local
neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability, it legitimately can decide
to structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover. Id. Second, the state
can legitimately conclude that a new owner, does not have the same reliance
interest warranting protection against higher taxes as does an existing owner,
who does not have the option of deciding not to buy his home if taxes become
prohibitively high. Id.
9 Affronti, 95 N.Y.2d at 719, 746 N.E.2d at 1052, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
20 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
21 Id. at 84. In Kimel, the plaintiffs alleged that the Florida Board of Regents
refused to require the two state universities to allocate funds to provide
previously agreed upon market adjustments to the salaries of eligible university
employees. Id. The plaintiffs contended that this failure had a disparate impact
on the base pay of employees with a longer record of service, most of who
were older employees. Id. The US Supreme Court held that the substantive
requirements the ADEA imposes on state and local governments are
4
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protection clause will be satisfied so long as there is a plausible
policy reason for the classification, and the legislative facts on
which the classification is based rationally may have been
considered to be true by the governmental decision maker.22
Therefore, a state has no obligation to produce evidence to
sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.23 Since the
statute in question is presumed to be constitutional, "the burden is
on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to [make]
negative every conceivable basis which might support it." 2
4
New York State Courts have decided similar cases dealing
with equal protection issues in the past by using the same rational
basis test employed by the federal courts. The New York Court
of Appeals has stated that to meet the test of rationality, it must
appear that there is "some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 25 In
Weissman v. Evans,26 the plaintiffs, District Court Judges of the
Suffolk District Court, sought a judgment declaring the
perpetuation of an unfavorable salary disparity between the
plaintiffs and the judges of Nassau County violative of the equal
disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduci that conceivably be targeted
by the act. See Id. at 62.
22 Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 11.
23 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
24 Heller, 509 U.S. at 320. In Heller, the respondents were a class of
mentally retarded persons committed involuntarily to Kentucky institutions.
Id. In Kentucky, involuntary civil commitments of those alleged to be mentally
retarded and mentally ill are governed by separate statutory procedures. Id.
The respondents argued that these distinctions were irrational and violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that under rational basis review, Kentucky's statutory procedures
did not violate the equal protection clause in view of the differences between
the two conditions of mental retardation and mental illness or the prevailing
methods of treatments for the two conditions. Id. Kentucky's statutory
provision for party-status participation by immediate family members with
respect to commitment based on mental retardation did not violate equal
protection because Kentucky might have concluded that close relatives have
valuable insights which ought to be considered during the commitment
process. Id. at 320.
25 Weissman v. Evans, 56 N.Y.2d 458, 465, 438 N.E.2d 397, 400 (1982).
26 56 N.Y.2d at 458, 438 N.E.2d at 397.
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protection provision. 27 The jurisdiction, practice, and procedures
of each of the District Courts, in addition to the functions, duties,
and responsibilities of the District Court Judges were identical
and their caseloads were the same.28  The court stated, "[a]
territorial distinction which has no rational basis will not support
a state statute." 29  Therefore, the court held that since the
disparate treatment of the District Courts in Nassau and Suffolk
Counties is without rational foundation, there is no choice but to
declare it offensive to the plaintiffs' constitutionality protected
right to equal protection of the laws of this state.3°
However, in the vast majority of cases the courts have
held, where a statute is not based on an inherently suspect
characteristic, the statute is constitutional. For example, in
Henry v. Milonas,31 the elected Surrogate and elected Ontario
County Court Judge sought a declaration that the difference
between their salaries and the salaries paid to judges of the
County, Family, and Surrogate's Court in contiguous Monroe
County violated their right to equal protection of the laws.32 The
Court of Appeals stated that the statewide differences in
population, caseload and cost of living provided a rational basis
for the legislature to adopt salary differentials for those serving in
different areas of the state.33 This case is indicative of the lower
standard of review when the test is that of rational basis.
In Barr v. Crosson,34 the court stated that plaintiffs
alleging a violation of equal protection must satisfy the "heavy
27 Id. at 460-61, 438 N.E.2d at 397.
28 id.
29 Id. at 465, 438 N.E.2d at 400.
30 Id. at 466, 438 N.E.2d at 401.
31 91 N.Y.2d 264, 692 N.E.2d 554, 669 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1998).
32Id. at 267, 692 N.E.2d at 555.
I d. at 268, 692 N.E.2d at 556. The state defendants submitted 1990
census data from the 1993 New York State Statistical Yearbook, which showed
a 16% differential in the median value of homes in Monroe and Ontario
Counties and a difference of 17% in per capita income between the two
counties. Id. These economic differentials alone provide a rational basis for a
salary disparity of approximately 4% - $103,800 for Monroe County-level
Judges and $99,000 for Ontario County-level Judges. Id.
34 95 N.Y.2d 164, 733 N.E.2d 217, 711 N.Y.S.2d 145 (2000).
6
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burden of proving that there is no reasonably conceivable state of
facts which rationally supports the distinction." 35  In fact,
economic differentials in median home values and per capita
income can "alone provide a rational basis for a salary
disparity." 36 These workload and economic differences provided
a rational basis for the less that 5 % pay differential challenged in
the Barr case.37
In Affronti, the issue at trial was whether the salary
disparities provided by state statute, between Sullivan and
Monroe County, satisfied the rational basis standard of review so
as to not violate plaintiffs' equal protection rights. 38 The court
concluded that the Appellate Division erred in not discussing the
census data brought before them on appeal. Since census data
reflects a legislative fact, as opposed to an evidentiary fact, the
data's absence from the record does not prevent its consideration
for the first time on appeal. 39 The court found that the census
data presented by the state on appeal, which illustrated the
difference in median home values, provided a rational basis for
the challenged provisions.4° With the wealth of case law
upholding the constitutionality when rational basis review is
utilized, it should come as no surprise that the Court in Affronti
upheld the statute.
" Id. at 170, 733 N.E.2d at 220, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 148. In Barr, the
plaintiffs, current and former Monroe County Court Judges, alleged that
defendants violated their right to equal protection by causing them to be paid
less that their counterpart judges in five other counties: Albany, Nassau,
Putnam, Suffolk, and Westchester. Id. at 167, 733 N.E.2d at 217, 711
N.Y.S.2d at 145.
36 Id. at 170, 733 N.E.2d at 220, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 148. (finding that the
median home value was over 34% higher in Albany County than in Monroe
County, and that the data established that Albany County Court handled 46%
more filings and 45 % more dispositions per judge than Monroe County).
37 Id.
38 Affronti, 95 N.Y.2d at 716, 746 N.E.2d at 1050, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 720, 746 N.E.2d at 1052, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 761. The state
defendants submitted 1990 U.S. Census data from the 1996 New York State
Statistical Yearbook demonstrating that median home values were
approximately 3 % higher in Sullivan County than in Monroe County - $93,400
to $90,700. Id. at 719.
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In conclusion, both state and federal courts deal with the
issue of equal protection in the same manner. First, the court
decides if the governmental classification is based on an
inherently suspect characteristic and if it impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right.41 If the court decides
that the governmental classification is absent a suspect class,
equal protection analysis requires the court to apply the rational
basis standard of review. According to this standard, the
challenged statute or governmental action is upheld if it bears a
rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest.42
In essence, this standard, as applied on both the federal
and state levels, is extremely hollow. Almost any statute can pass
as constitutional under the rational basis standard of review. A
statute will satisfy the rational basis test so long as there is a
plausible policy reason for the classification. Therefore, it seems
as if the rational basis standard used by both the federal and state
courts to determine whether a statute violates a person's equal
protection rights, provides broad discretion to the legislature in
enacting laws.
Jonathan Janofsky
41 Id. at 718, 746 N.E.2d at 1052, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
42 Id.
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